
https://doi.org/10.15344/2456-351X/2016/108
Abstract
Climate change has been described as one of the greatest challenges to international cooperation that the world has faced. Thus the climate problem is a classic problem of dealing with global goods. Game theory is one of the tools that can be used to identify key criteria for designing frameworks for international collective action on climate change. Such collective action will be used to present the evolution of cooperative behaviour. The world has realized that tackling the climate change will be costly and therefore the temptation to pollute will be always present. Can the stochastic element in our climate game, which means some level of uncertainty, increase the probability of adopting the cleaner strategy? Historic climate deal in Paris sets out a global actions plan to put the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C. To reach such ambitious target cooperation by all countries is required. All countries need to act urgently and collectively.